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Court-Annexed Arbitration:
Kentucky's Viable Alternative to
Litigation
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner
is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As
a peacemaker, the lawyer has a supenor opportunity of being
a good man. There will still be business enough.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger expressed deep
concern over the explosion of litigation in this country' and
suggested that arbitration 2 may be a better way to handle "the
mushrooming caseloads of the courts." '3 There is little dispute
* Abraham Lincoln (1850), reprinted in Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution in
Kentucky, Report to the Supreme Court of Kentucky by the CDR Task Force on Court-
Annexed Dispute Resolution (March 1989).
One commentator says the litigation explosion resulted "from a marked imbal-
ance between the number of cases filed and the limited and relatively fixed judicial
resources available to process these cases." Simom, Court-Annexed Arbitration In Or-
egon: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 22 WmuAmsm L. Rnv 237, 241 (1986).
2 Arbitration can be defined as "[a]n arrangement for taking and abiding by the
judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established
tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and
vexation of ordinary litigation." BLACK's LAW DicTioNAY 96 (5th ed. 1983) (citations
omitted). For a discussion of the history and procedure of arbitration, see Note, The
New Jersey Alternative Procedure For Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better
Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. Rav 1723, 1727-31 (1988) (authored by John V O'Hara). See
also Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425 (1987-88).
Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (March 1982). The Chief
Justice stated:
The obligation of our profession is, or has long been thought to be, to
serve as healers of human conflicts. To fulfill our traditional obligation
means that we should provide mechanisms that can produce an acceptable
result in the shortest possible time, with the least possible expense, and
with a mimmum of stress on the participants. That is what justice is all
about.
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among members of the legal commumty that litigation delays
and court backlogs4 have become an enormous problem in this
country 5 In some court systems, it takes years for a case to be
resolved, 6 causing frustration among attorneys, judges, and liti-
gants and, more important, "reduc[ing] public confidence in the
judicial system." '7 A remedy must be found to solve this problem
because litigants desire fast, efficient, and inexpensive justice.
State legislatures and courts alike have considered several
alternatives to remedy the growing problem facing our judicial
system.8 One remedy that has recently emerged is court-annexed
The law is a tool, not an end in itself. Like any tool, particular
judicial mechanisms, procedures, or rules can become obsolete. [We
should be alert to the need for better tools to serve our purposes.
Against this background, I focus today on arbitration, not as the
answer or cure-all for the mushrooming caseloads of the courts, but as
one example of "a better way to do it."
Id. at 274-76; see also Note, On Behalf of Mandatory Arbitration, 57 S. CAL. L. REv
1039, 1039 (1984) (authored by DaoUd A. Awad) ("[T]he hope behind arbitration systems
is finally to resolve many disputes-either by the parties' acceptance of the arbitrator's
decision or by their using that decision as a basis for further settlement negotiations-
without resort to further legal proceedings.").
4 "Litigation delay increases and case backlogs grow when the number of case
filings exceeds the number of case dispositions. Seen from this perspective, the problem
of litigation delay is primarily one of resources. [The] solution is formed in an increase
in resources." Simom, supra note 1, at 242.
1 "Without exception, the courts that turn to arbitration have done so to deal
more effectively with increasing congestion on their trial calendars. Congestion creates
a problem when a backlog of cases increases, thereby lengthening the time it takes to
dispose of a typical case, and this prolonged disposition time offends a community's
sense of justice." E. RoLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION 6 (1984).
"Excessive delay has serious consequences: it prolongs the anxiety of the litigants,
undermines the value of judgments, and results in the loss or deterioration of evidence."
Simom, supra note 1, at 239 n.8.
6 Snow and Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court-Annexed Arbitration, 20
CAL. W.L. REv. 43, 43 (1983). "For example, the time for civil cases to come to trial
in Los Angeles county, California, currently stands at forty months and is continually
growing with time." Id. at 43 n.1 (citing JUICIAL CouNcm oF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ADmiNasTRATnIE OFIFICE OF CALORNIA COURTS 89 (1982)).
Simom, supra note 1, at 238-39 (citation omitted).
'Some of these alternatives include negotiation, mediation, summary jury trial,
and arbitration. While this Note will focus only upon the alternative of court-annexed
arbitration, the recent controversy surrounding the use of summary jury trials as an
alternative dispute method may have implications upon court-annexed arbitration pro-
grams. In Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988), the
Seventh Circuit held that federal district courts do not have the power to require parties
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arbitration. 9 By 1987, at least twenty-two states had implemented
some form of court-annexed arbitration, a number that contin-
ues to increase each year.10 There are several ways this program
to participate in nonbinding summary jury trials. Id. at 888. This decision is important
to an analysis of court-annexed arbitration because it could inhibit the adoption of a
mandatory court-annexed arbitration program. The Strandell decision was recently chal-
lenged, however, by the Eastern District of Kentucky in McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988). In McKay, District Judge Bertlesman disagreed with
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Strandell, holding that federal district courts do have
power to require parties to participate in summary jury trials. Id. at 44. While the
McKay court's disagreement with the Strandell holding involved, to some extent, dis-
tinctions between local court rules, the court supported its contention on other grounds
as well. The court cited favorably several cases that have upheld mandatory nonbinding
arbitration, and stated that "[a] summary jury trial is essentially nonbinding arbitration
with an advisory jury instead of arbitrators." Id. at 45. Thus, one could easily conclude
that since the court upheld the use of nonbinding summary jury trials, it would likewise
view mandatory court-annexed arbitration as a valid dispute alternative as long as the
litigants are granted the right to appeal for a jury trial. For an excellent discussion of
the Strandell and McKay decisions and their effect on summary jury trials, see Comment,
Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, 77 Ky. L.J.
421 (1988-89) (authored by Paul Mattingly).
9 Court-annexed arbitration can be briefly described as follows:
Court-annexed arbitration is a court-run dispute resolution process to which
cases that meet some specified criteria are involuntarily assigned. Operating
under special rules, arbitrators hear the case and render awards. However,
their awards are not binding. To avoid the possibility of abridging consti-
tutional or statutory protections granting litigants the right to a jury trial,
parties may always appeal an arbitrator's award by requesting and receiving
a trial de novo (a new trial, without regard to the prior arbitration hearing
or outcome) back on the traditional adjudicative track.
E. RoLPH & D. HENSLER, COtrT-ORiEano AR~rrR.ATioN: THE CALIoRNiA EXPERIENCE
2 (1984) [hereinafter RoLPH & HENSLER]. See infra notes 25-77 and accompanying text
for a more detailed explanation and discussion of court-annexed arbitration.
10 S. LEESON & B. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA 78
(1988). See Walker, Court-Ordered Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and the Nation,
21 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 901, 914 (1986). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.190 (1986);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-133 (Supp. 1987); ARiz. UNN. R. PROC. ARE., CAL. CIv
PRoc. CODE §§ 1141.10-.32 (West Cum. Supp. 1989); CAL. R. CT. 1600-17; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52-549u-.549z (West Cum. Supp. 1988); DEL. SUPER. CT. Cxv R. 16(c);
D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. ARE. R., HAw. Rnv. STAT. §§ 601-20 (Cum. Supp. 1987); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001A (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.73 (West Cum.
Supp. 1989); MINN. 4TH JuD. DIST. R. 5.01-.12; NEv. 1,Ev STAT. §§ 38.215-.255 (1987);
N.Y.R. OF CT. §§ 28.1-.15 (McKinney, 1989); Omo R. SUPERINTEND. CT. C.P.R. 15;
CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS-GEN. Drv., Oio C.P.R. 65; FRANKLIN COUNTY
COMMON PLmAs-GEN. Div., OHIo C.P.R. 65; HAMILTON COUNTY COMMON PLEAS, OHIo
C.P.R. 24; OR. REv STAT. §§ 33.350-.400 (1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361
(Purdon 1982); WASH. REv CODE ANN. §§ 7.06.010-.910 (1987); WASH. SUPER. CT.
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can become part of any state court system." Regardless of the
method used, "[tihe general goal of court-[annexed] arbitration
is to create an efficient, economical alternative to traditional
civil litigation for prompt resolution of cases.' 12
This Note will address all aspects of court-annexed arbitra-
tion and its effect on the judicial system. Part I provides a
general discussion of the reasons for court-annexed arbitration. 13
Part II gives a complete analysis of court-annexed arbitration
programs, focusing on general descriptions of the programs and
the differences between mandatory and permissive programs.
4
Part III considers the perceived advantages and disadvantages
MANDATORY ARB. R. 1.1-8.5.
Court-annexed arbitration has also become a part of the federal judicial system.
Presently, there are ten U.S. district courts with court-annexed arbitration programs:
Eastern District of Pennsylvama; Northern District of California; Middle District of
Florida; Middle District of North Carolina; District of New Jersey; Western District of
Oklahoma; Western District of Missouri; Western District of Texas; Western District of
Michigan; and Eastern District of New York. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory
Arbitration: It Works, 72 JuDicATURE 217.222 (Dec.-Jan. 1989). On November 19, 1988,
President Reagan signed into law the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act.
Title IX of this new Act amends Title 28 of the United States Code by inserting a new
chapter, "Chapter 44 Arbitration." Id. at 224. See Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 907. The Act authorizes court-annexed arbitration
programs in twenty U.S. district courts. Broderick, supra, at 217. This new legislation
signifies the increased awareness of court-annexed arbitration as an alternative to liti-
gation.
" There are three ways court-annexed arbitration becomes involved in the local
court judicial system:
[a] state legislature may enact a statute that specifies the structure of the
program it wants, and then it either requires or permits the local courts to
put such a program in place. Alternatively, some state supreme courts
may, by court rule, adopt a program, outlimng its structure and either
mandating or permitting local courts to use it if they wish. Finally, where
legal rules permit local innovation of this type, local courts may institute
court-annexed arbitration on their own initiative.
Constitutional authority permitting the adoption of arbitration pro-
cedures vanes greatly from state to state. Wich route is used often depends
upon the relative authority of judicial and legislative branches as set forth
in the constitution that governs the jurisdiction.
E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 7.
The procedure to be used by Kentucky in adopting arbitration procedures is beyond
the scope of this Note. As mentioned above, it depends upon an interpretation of the
Kentucky Constitution.
12 Walker, supra note 10, at 904.
," See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 25-77 and accompanying text.
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of court-annexed arbitration as it relates to traditional litiga-
tion. 15 Part IV addresses the prominent concerns that accompany
court-annexed arbitration programs, emphasizAng the constitu-
tional implications. 16 Part V discusses the various options avail-
able to Kentucky m adopting a court-annexed arbitration program
as an alternative to litigation. 7 Ultimately, this Note concludes
that Kentucky should adopt a mandatory court-annexed arbitra-
tion program.' s
I. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Historically, when backlogs in the court system grew too
large, additional judicial positions were created to handle the
increased congestion. Today, however, fiscal constraints are
forcing courts to consider other alternatives, known as alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR), to solve the problem of court
congestion. These programs are designed to encourage judicial
efficiency without eroding the quality of justice. 9 Of the various
types of alternative dispute resolution methods,20 court-annexed
arbitration has the most widespread support and approval as an
alternative to traditional litigation. 2' Supporters of court-annexed
" See infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
' See mfra notes 95-177 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 178-92 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
29 E. RoLPH, supra note 5, at 6. Edward B. McConnell, former director of the
National Center for State Courts, explained the function of alternative dispute resolution
as follows:
The task of providing final and binding resolution of civil disputes in our
nation has histoncally been the responsibility of the judicial system. While
our judicial system has not shirked this growing burden, there is an
increasing awareness among those interested in the admimstration of justice
that alternative procedures of forums might be developed to handle por-
tions of this civil dispute resolution function, to simplify and expedite the
process, and perhaps to provide relief without the necessity of formally
deciding the issues involved.
E. JOHNSON, JR., V KANTON & E. ScHwARTz, OuTsIDE THE CouRTs: A StrRva OF
DrvERSiON ALTERNATivEs iN CIvIL CASES vii (1977).
- There exist four primary ADR models-negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and
adjudication. For an excellent discussion of these ADR models, see Note, "No Frills"
Justice: North Carolina Experiments With Court-Ordered Arbitration, 66 N.C.L. REv
395, 397-98 (1988) (authored by William Kinsland Edwards).
22 Id. at 396.
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arbitration view the program as "promising simple, fast, and
inexpensive adjudication [for] litigants and a means of reducing
judicial workloads and controlling public expenditures for civil
court administrators. ' 22 Therein lies the rationale behind the
popularity of court-annexed arbitration and its acceptance as a
viable alternative to litigation.
As mentioned above, alternative dispute resolution, court-
annexed arbitration in particular, is designed to promote judicial
efficiency without losing sight of the need to maintain or enhance
the quality of justice provided to potential litigants. More spe-
cifically, an effective court-annexed arbitration program seeks
to accomplish three distinct goals: (1) to provide a fast, econom-
ically efficient, equitable, and informal resolution of civil dis-
putes; (2) to keep intact the procedural and substantive due
process rights of a litigant; and (3) to ensure litigants, attorneys,
and the courts of satisfactory adjudication. 2 While all three
goals are important, the latter two are imperative to a successful
court-annexed arbitration program. Thus, while a court-annexed
arbitration program should strive to attain these goals, it is
critical to maintain a high quality of justice for the litigants, or
the program risks failure. 24
II. COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAMS
A. General Description
Court-annexed arbitration, also known as court-ordered ar-
bitration, judicial arbitration, or court-admimstered arbitration,
is becoming an increasingly popular form of alternative dispute
resolution.25 Court-annexed arbitration can best be described as
a court-run dispute resolution process to which cases that meet
some specified criteria are involuntarily assigned. Operating
2 Id. (quoting J. ADLER, D. HENSLER & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE: How Lm-
GANTS FAP IN TrE PITTSBURGH COURT ARITMATION PROaRAM 60, at 1 (1983) [hereinafter
SnPLE JUSTICE]).
Id. at 409.
24 Id. at 410.




under special rules, arbitrators hear the case and render awards.
However, their awards are not binding. To avoid the possibility
of abridging constitutional or statutory protections granting
litigants the right to a jury trial, parties may always appeal an
arbitrator's award by requesting and receiving a trial de novo
(a new trial, without regard to the prior arbitration heanng or
outcome) back on the traditional adjudicative track.2
Whether created by state legislation or by court rule, court-
annexed arbitration programs share certain basic characteristics:
(1) value limitations; (2) prehearing activities; (3) arbitration
hearings and awards; (4) trial de novo; and (5) disincentives to
appeal for a trial de novo. The following discussion of these
basic characteristics will explain more fully how such programs
are operated.
1. Value Limitations
The monetary value of a particular case is a consideration
in subjecting cases to court-annexed arbitration. Usually, states
will propose a dollar limitation on the value of the cases that
may be assigned to arbitration. 27 The dollar limitations range
from $3,000 to $150,000, depending on the junsdiction. 28 The
26 ROiH & HENsLER, supra note 9, at 2. Court-annexed arbitration is different
from private arbitration in two respects. First, court-annexed arbitration is a court-
imposed, public hearing conducted under complete court supervision and guidance.
Whereas, in private arbitration, the parties agree to arbitrate by contract, which is signed
before a cause of action occurs, and the hearings are generally private in nature with
no court supervision. Second, if a party is not satisfied with the outcome in the court-
annexed arbitration hearing, he or she may appeal for a trial by jury. By contrast, in
private arbitration, an appeal trial on the merits is prohibited, thus, the arbitrator's
decision is binding on the parties. See Walker, supra note 10, at 905.
2 E. Ro'H, supra note 5, at 12. In general, all civil actions for monetary relief
which do not exceed some dollar limit are subject to arbitration.
21 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.43.190 (1986) ($3,000); ARiz. Rnv STAT. ANN. §
12-133(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1987) ($50,000); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1141.11 (West
Cum. Supp. 1989) ($55,000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-549u (West Cum. Supp.
1988) ($15,000); DEL. SURER. CT. Civ R. 16(c) ($50,000); HAw. Rv. STAT. §§ 601-20
(Supp. 1987) ($150,000); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001A (1987) ($15,000); Mim.
4TH JuD. DiST. R. 5.02(a)(1) ($50,000); NEv. Rnv STAT. §§ 38.215(i), .255(3)(a) (1987)
($3,000 for motor vehicle cases, $15,000 for district court-ordered arbitration generally);
N.Y.R. OF CT. 28.2(b) (McKinney 1989) ($6,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37 (1986)
($15,000); N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1(a); CUYAHOGA CoumNv, Omo C.P.R. 29(1) ($20,000);
HAMITON CoUNTY, Omao C.P.R. 24(A)(1)(d) ($25,000); STARK COUNTY, Omo C.P.R.
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rationale behind a dollar limitation is twofold. First, "[a] dollar
restriction is used because the purpose of arbitration is to enable
persons with small or moderately sized claims to assert their
rights." 29 Second, a dollar limitation allows the state to deter-
mine the number of cases they wish to refer to arbitration-the
higher the dollar limitation, the greater the number of cases to
be arbitrated. For example, if a state wants to submit a large
number of cases to arbitration, it will affix a high dollar lim-
tation (e.g., $150,000).3o Whereas, if a state feels that a small
number of cases should be arbitrated, it will install a low dollar
limitation (e.g., $3,000).31
Much debate has arisen over how cases should be valuated
to determine eligibility for court-annexed arbitration. There are
three possibilities: (1) the litigants value their own case;32 (2) the
16.02(A) ($25,000); OR. Rnv STAT. § 33.360(a) (1987) ($25,000 in circuit court, $10,000
in district court); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(b)(2) (Purdon 1982) ($10,000 to
$20,000 depending on county); WAsH. REv CODE ANN. § 7.06.020 (1987) ($10,000 to
$25,000 depending on superior court judges' approval).
2 Note, supra note 3, at 1041.
30 Hawaii's 1986 legislature increased its arbitration jurisdictional limit to $150,000.
HAW REv STAT. at §§ 601-20.
11 See ALASKA STAT. at § 09.43.190.
32 E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 15.
Litigants can value their own cases in several ways. States that require
plaintiffs to file ad damnum statements when filing suit simply use that
valuation as the basis for assigning the case to arbitration. Pennsylvania
adopted this model in 1952, and other states now use it. Courts that do
not require ad damnum statements may require plaintiffs and parties filing
counterclaims to value their claims or file a statement of arbitrability.
Parties can file these valuations when they initially file suit. But typically
the court requests this statement when parties note their case is ready for
trial, at which point the parties have a better appreciation of the case's
worth. If the litigants' valuations indicate the case falls within the juns-
dictional limits of arbitration, then the case is diverted to the arbitration
track immediately. In a third approach to litigant valuing, the California
enabling statute permits a plaintiff to submit his case directly to arbitration
once he has filed his at-issue memorandum, regardless of the defendant's
preferences. By so doing, the plaintiff declares the value of his case to be
less than $15,000 and implicitly accepts a cap of that amount on his award.
The District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania offers yet another variation.
In that court, all cases are presumed to fall within the program's jurisdic-
tional limits. To be exempted, a party must file an affidavit with the court
stating that the value of the case exceeds the limit.
All of these approaches offer a simple, cheap, and fast procedure for
moving cases on to the arbitration track. However, the program becomes
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court makes the valuation;13 or (3) the court sets an objective
case characteristic to serve as a proxy for value. 34 None of these
somewhat voluntary, because litigants can escape it, at least initially, simply
by placing a high value on their cases. It might be an appropriate procedure
for a court whose users supported the idea of arbitration, but not for a
court whose users opposed introduction of the program. Moreover, plain-
tiffs who value their claims at close to the jurisdictional limit might well
not want to foreclose the possibility that they be awarded more than the
limit, even though they would happily submit to arbitration. To eliminate
this obstacle to accurate valuing, courts should not preclude arbitrators
from making awards that exceed the jurisdictional limit.
Id. at 15-16.
33 Id. at 15.
Numerous programs direct the court to value each potentially eligible case.
For example, California's arbitration statute requires courts to value each
eligible case at some point after the plaintiff has filed an at-issue memo
and before the case is set for trial.
California law requires the courts to value cases, but courts have
interpreted this requirement differently. In many, judges value the cases,
either in early screening/settlement conferences or in the later trial setting
conferences. In at least one court, however, the arbitration staff values
cases, and litigants have the right to appeal the valuations to a judge. In
another court, a commissioner values the case. Clearly, the innovative
efforts to substitute parajudicial for judicial time are intended to reduce
the costs and demands of the program, while still controlling the disposition
of cases. Courts experimenting with these alternatives say they work well,
and attorneys have not reported any dissatisfaction.
California courts vary considerably in the exact procedures they have
adopted for the screening. Some courts do not screen their civil cases until
shortly before they would otherwise go to trial. Late screening, these courts
argue, gives most cases time to settle and thus reduces the number to be
screened. A court can combine its screening conference with a settlement
conference, thereby reviewing a case only once and saving itself time and
money. Other courts argue that screening cases at early conferences removes
many cases from the calendar before the court has spent much time on
them; therefore early screening more than pays for itself. Early screening
allows cases going to arbitration to be heard sooner and disposed of faster.
Although this debate continues, some courts are switching from late to




Courts can also value cases by using some objective characteristic of the
case as a proxy for the value. For example, a case would be objectively
valued if, say, in a personal injury suit when the claimed medical expenses
fall under $1,000, the court automatically presumes the case should be
valued at less than $10,000 and assigns it to arbitration. Although this
kind of screening mechamsm is fast and reasonably cheap to implement,
KENTUCKY LAW JoUiRNAL
alternatives are flawless, and the final decision will have a def-
mite impact on the economic efficiency of the program and the
ability of the court to divert cases to arbitration expeditiously 31
Therefore, the valuation of cases for arbitration is of major
importance to a court-annexed arbitration program.
2. Prehearing Determinations
There are numerous determinations that occur before the
arbitration hearing is conducted. First, many cases will be ex-
cluded from the arbitration process at the prehearing stage be-
courts have not used it until recently, probably because finding a good
valuing proxy is not easy. Some also report they believe it will simply lead
doctors to inflate diagnoses and give excessive treatment.
In New Jersey, where arbitration applies only to motor vehicle cases,
two courts are now experimenting with objective valuing procedures. In
Union County Court, local rules provide that a case is presumed to have
less in controversy than the jurisdictional limit of $15,000 if the plaintiff's
medical expenses are less than $2,500. The rules go on to define medical
expenses as the amount reported to the court by the plaintiff's counsel on
the court's case management form. Burlington County Court, however,
uses the type of claim as the value criterion. If the claim is only for
property damage or for soft tissue personal injury, then the claim is
presumed to fall within the jurisdictional limit. In both courts, parties may
be removed from the arbitration roster if they successfully argue that their
particular cases have a higher value. Conversely, if the parties fail to
provide the court with the necessary information on type of injury or
medical expenses, the case is automatically assigned to arbitration. Al-
though New Jersey has only recently pioneered the use of objective valu-
ation, the two courts there report it shows great promise as an inexpensive
but effective technique for diverting cases to arbitration.
Id. at 16-17
'1 Id. at 15. Rolph explains further:
For example, if litigants value their own cases, court costs will be low; but
many litigants may overvalue their cases, thereby reducing the diversion
capability of the program. If the court values each case, the program may
realize its full potential. However, the program will cost more to run,
because courts must use their personnel to do the screening. If a court
chooses to use a proxy-say, the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff
or the plaintiff's medical expenses-it can control costs, as cases require
no special court review. Using a proxy can divert many reluctant partici-
pants to arbitration, because the characteristics of their cases identify them
as eligible. However, proxies are imprecise. Some share of the eligible cases
will continue to slip through, and another portion will be improperly
assigned to the program.
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cause of the subject matter of the suit. Common exclusions from
the court-annexed arbitration program include class actions,
crimnal actions, claims for equitable, injunctive or declaratory
relief, questions involving family law or probate issues, and real
estate actions.16 Most states typically apply the program to suits
seeking money damages or to civil actions. 37 A case may also be
excluded from the arbitration program if it presents "primarily
legal, as opposed to factual, issues, or in which a case presents
novel legal or factual matters."38 Also, several states have ex-
cluded cases for "control" purposes in connection with evalua-
tion programs to assess the success of court-annexed arbitration.3 9
Second, a determination must be made regarding the number
of arbitrators sitting on a hearing panel and the method of
selecting these arbitrators. Trade-offs must be made when decid-
ing how many arbitrators will sit on the panel. Some programs
use three arbitrators, 40 whereas other programs use only one
arbitrator. 41 Each alternative has its advantages: 42
Walker, supra note 10, at 919.
" E. RoLPH, supra note 5, at 12.
SWalker, supra note 10, at 920-21.
" Id. at 921.
"0 See ILL. REv STAT. at ch. 110, para. 2-1003A, N.Y.R. oF C.J. at § 28.4(b);
Omo R. SuPERiNTEND. CT. C.P.R. 15(B) (Implemented by, for example, CUYAHOGA
CouNTY, Omo C.P.R. 29(II)(A)-(C)); FRANIuqN CouNirY, Omo C.P.R. 65.03; HAmILTON
CotmrY, Omo C.P.R. 24(C)-24(E); STARK COUNTY, Omo C.P.R. 16.03-16.05.
" See W.D. MicH. R. 43(f)(3); Min. 4TH Jun. DIST. R. 5.10; D.N.J.R. 47(D)(2);
M.D.N.C.R. 605; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. at § 52-549u; N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2;
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33.390(1) (1987); WAsH. Rav CODE ANN. § 7.06.050 (1987).
41 The advantages of a single arbitrator panel are two-fold. First, scheduling
difficulties inherent in trying to accommodate the schedules of two litigants,
their attorneys, and three arbitrators are reduced if only one arbitrator is
involved. Second, a program that uses one arbitrator is less expensive than
a program that uses three arbitrators.
The advantages that attend a three-person panel, however, are signif-
icant. A three-person panel reduces the possibility that the arbitration
award will be a product of bias or incompetence. Jurisdictions that use
three-person arbitration panels strive for a balanced representation with
attorneys from the plaintiffs' and defense bar as well as a third attorney
who is a neutral. The balanced composition of the panel reduces the
likelihood that arbitration awards will be biased because of a single arbi-
trator's predilections. Moreover, a three-person panel will, in general, bring
a greater range of experience and expertise to a case than will a single
arbitrator.
Simoni, supra note 1, at 261 (citations omitted).
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A program using one arbitrator is cheaper, easier to schedule,
and imposes less of a burden on the arbitrator pool than a
program using more. However, many courts believe that a
panel of three arbitrators is likely to render fairer decisions
and give litigants more confidence in the arbitration process.43
A state should use the approach that will best achieve its goals.
There are various ways to select arbitrators.44 Whichever
procedure is ultimately adopted, the parties are given some op-
portunity to determine the composition of the arbitration panel.
The litigants have the opportunity to disqualify an arbitrator if
good cause is shown. Also, litigants may wish to stipulate to a
panel of arbitrators that they have chosen. Many court-annexed
arbitration programs allow the parties to choose among several
possible arbitrators. In this process, a slate of candidates is sent
to the attorneys who may strike names or rank arbitrators by
preference. Based on these rankings, the arbitrators are assigned
to the suit. 45
Another issue at the prehearmg stage involves the compen-
sation of arbitrators. Although an arbitrator's fee is usually
small in amount, 46 a source for this compensation must be
found. Compensation for arbitrators usually comes from county
or state revenue programs. 47 Many programs, however, place
this cost on the party appealing for a tnal de novo or failing to
improve its position on the appeal. 4
The discovery process during court-annexed arbitration cre-
ates an interesting conflict. To meet the objectives of a simple,
' E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 18.
" "Some go through their arbitration lists alphabetically. Some use a random
draw procedure. And some manage the assignment process in a more personal way,
relying on the arbitration admimstrator's knowledge of good matches and schedules.
Each of these methods seems to work well." Ei Ro rr, supra note 5, at 19. For
additional discussion on the method of choosing arbitrators, see Walker, supra note 10,
at 924-25.
41 E. RoLsH, supra note 5, at 19.
" "The amount of compensation generally ranges from 50 to 150 dollars per day
or case. Some programs, however, appear to anticipate that lawyers will view arbitration
service as a pro bono activity." Note, supra note 3, at 1042.
4 Id., see, e.g.., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. at § 12-133(G); CAL. CIV PRoc. CODE at
§ 1141.28; N.Y.R. oF C.J. at § 28.10; WASH. REv CODE ANN. at § 7.06.040.
"' Note, supra note 3, at 1042; see, e.g., Aiuz. REv STAT. ANN. at § 12-133(I);
CAL. CrV PROC. CODE at § 1141.21(a); N.Y.R. OF C.J. at § 28.12(c).
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efficient, and expedient adjudicative forum, it seems logical to
constrain discovery during arbitration hearings. 49 The trial bar,
however, feels that rushed discovery procedures do not allow
enough time to provide adequate representation for their cli-
ents.50 Nevertheless, in many state programs, discovery is re-
stricted by time limitations.5i Furthermore, there is the issue of
whether parties can "obtain further discovery if the action con-
tinues for a trial de novo. ' ' 52 These discovery issues are complex
and must be considered when adopting a court-annexed arbitra-
tion program.
3. Arbitration Hearing and Award
The arbitration hearing is typically held within a short time
after the case is assigned to an arbitrator. In Califorma, for
instance, the "hearings are to be scheduled no sooner than thirty-
five days, but no later than sixty days, from the date the case
is assigned to an arbitrator. ' 53 This promptness is consistent
with the objective of expedient adjudication.
Although the rules of evidence are generally used to control
the hearing, most programs do not require strict compliance. 54
This is consistent with the theory that "arbitration proceedings
are typically designed to afford each side the opportunity to
present its story without being shut off by the formal operation
of rules." '55
The powers given to arbitrators in hearings vary. Most court-
annexed arbitration programs give arbitrators quasi-judicial powr
41 E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 23. Obviously, limited discovery provides quicker
and less expensive adjudication for parties which, in turn, promotes the objectives behind
court-annexed arbitration.
" Id. It must be noted, however, that expedient adjudication will no likely override
adequate representation.
SI Note, supra note 3, at 1041; see, e.g., Atiz. Umi'n. R. 3; CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE
at § 1141.24; CAL. CT. R. 1612; WAsH. SUPER. CT. MANDATORY AREnRATioN R. 4.2.
Z Note, supra note 3, at 1041. "Califorma's program prohibits discovery after the
arbitration award has been rendered, except on permission of the court." Id. at n.10.
11 Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 50; see CAL. R. CT. 16.11.
1, See N.D. CAL. R. 500-5(c) (conformity to evidence rules not required); M.D.
FLA. R. 8.04(d) (not required to follow formal rules of evidence); E.D. PA. Crv R.
(5)(3) (rules of evidence used as a guide).
,1 Note, supra note 3, at 1043.
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ers, such as "the right to subpoena witnesses, give oaths, rule
on evidence, and so on."'5 6 Arbitrators, however, are usually
limited in their power to grant continuances in hearings.17 A
delicate balance must be struck so that the arbitrator's powers
do not circumvent those explicitly reserved to the courts.
The arbitrator's award is usually filed shortly after the hear-
ing is concluded 58 One of the reasons parties choose arbitration
is for quick results, and an expeditious arbitration award achieves
this result. Rules require the award to be in writing,59 and the
award may exceed the maximum allowed by law. 60
4. Trial De Novo
Several options are available for litigants after the arbitrator
has rendered the award. First, the award can become a judgment
if the parties elect not to appeal for a jury trial.61 Second, the
parties may take the award and use it as a basis for settlement. 62
36 E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 23. In California, the arbitrator's powers are as
follows:
(1) to administer oaths to witnesses;
(2) to take adjournments on the request of a party or on his or her own
initiative when deemed necessary;
(3) to permit testimony to be offered by deposition;
(4) to permit evidence to be offered and introduced as provided in the
rules;
(5) to rule on the admissibility and relevancy of evidence offered;
(6) to invite the parties, on reasonable notice, to submit trial briefs;
(7) to decide the laws and facts of the case and to make an award
accordingly;
(8) to award costs, not to exceed the statutory cost of the suit; and
(9) to examine any site or object relevant to the case.
Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 51; see CAL. R. CT. 1614(a).
7 E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 23.
"' Walker, supra note 10, at 930. Walker states further, "[s]ome rules permit a
lengthy interval between the heanng and the award, perhaps as long as four months.
Some rules provide only that the award shall be filed 'promptly.' A few rules provide
for motions to correct the award or for a rehearing." Id.
11 Id., see N.C. CT.-Oiw. ARB. R. 4(a).
60 Walker, supra note 10, at 930; see, e.g., CAL. Civ PROC. CODE § 1141.26 (West
Cum. Supp. 1989) (the award may exceed the amount in controversy); N.C. CT.-Oiw.
ARB. R. 4(c) (the award can exceed $15,000, the statutory limit).
61 Walker, supra note 10, at 932. A non-contested judgment is the ultimate objec-
tive of court-annexed arbitration because it indicates that both parties are satisfied with
the arbitrator's award and feel as if they had their "day in court."
62 Id. Again, a settlement rendered after an arbitrator's award shows that the
parties have confidence in the program and are content with the way it is operated.
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Finally, if the jurisdiction allows, the losing litigant may appeal
for a trial de novo. 63
The party who is not satisfied with the arbitration award
must file a written demand for a trial de novo to be granted. 64
The demand must be made before the award becomes a final
judgment. This period is commonly referred to as the "cooling-
off" period, 65 and allows the parties a chance to assess their
positions and chances for improving their award with a trial de
novo. A trial de novo may be necessary "to protect a person's
right to jury trial or to prevent the unlawful delegation of
judicial power." 66 Therefore, a trial de novo appeal has an
important function in court-annexed arbitration.
5. Disincentives to Appeal for Trial De NKovo
Usually, there is a financial disincentive for litigants to ap-
peal for trial de novo. This disincentive tyliclly arises in one
of three ways: (1) the appellant pays a filing fee for his appeal;
(2) the appellant pays the arbitrator's cost of hearing the matter
originally; or (3) the appellant pays his adversary's court costs.67
Many courts require penalties to be imposed on the appellant if
he fails to improve his position at trial, while other courts impose
them whenever an appeal is filed.6 It is argued, however, that
these financial disincentives may become unduly burdensome on
the right to jury trial. 69
63 Id.
' Id. at 933.
65 Id. at 932. Walker states:
This period runs from fifteen to thirty days, which is long enough for
possible resolution by settlement negotiations short of trial but brief enough
so that the prevailing party is not unduly prejudiced and the goal of
relatively speedy dispute resolution is furthered. In reality, this is the second
opportunity for resolution by settlement during a grace period if the
arbitrator does not make a decision immediately at the close of the hearing
and takes the matter under advisement, as most rules permit. As in tradi-
tional litigation, counsel or parties may be able to assess the case based
on the progress of the hearing as a form of mim-trial.
Id. at 933 (footnotes omitted).
" Note, supra note 3, at 1044. For a full discussion of the constitutional issues
involved m court-annexed arbitration, see infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text.
67 E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 27.
" Note, supra note 3, at 1044.
- For further discussion on the issue of whether disincentives violate the right to
jury trial, see infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
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In many situations there is also a non-financial disincentive
to appeal which arises from the arbitration program itself. It
has been shown that in many instances court-annexed arbitration
awards are equivalent to awards obtained through traditional
litigation. As such, any incentive to appeal is dimmshed as the
litigants view the arbitration award as equivalent to what could
be won at trial.70
Disincentives to appeal for a trial de novo serve two main
purposes. First, disincentives reduce court backlogs and decrease
litigation delays because "[c]ourt-[annexed] arbitration will suc-
ceed in reducing backlog and delay only if a substantial propor-
tion of the cases diverted to the arbitration do not return to
litigation. If a substantial proportion of the cases diverted to
arbitration return to the litigation track, court-[annexed] arbitra-
tion will have done nothing to decrease litigation delay "171 There-
fore, disincentives keep cases from returning to litigation, Second,
disincentives to appeal discourage the frivolous exercise of ap-
peals because "if litigants can appeal at no cost, they will often
file as part of their negotiating strategy or simply to keep their
options open." ' 72 Disincentives to appeal, therefore, help pro-
mote the disposition of the case at arbitration and discourage
frivolous appeals. Thus, court-annexed arbitration does not be-
come "a meaningless preamble to a regular trial. '73
Disincentives to appeal play an important role in any court-
annexed arbitration program. Thus, when implementing a pro-
gram, the rationale behind disincentives must be considered along
with the constitutional implications resulting from their use.
B. Mandatory vs. Permissive Court-Annexed Arbitration
Court-annexed arbitration programs consist of two types-
mandatory and pernssive. Under mandatory court-annexed ar-
bitration, state law requires the matter in dispute be resolved by
70 See Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 48.
11 Simom, supra note 1, at 263-64 n.128. Simom cautions, "[i]n fact, diverting
cases to arbitration may succeed only in increasing litigation delay and cost by inserting
an additional procedural obstacle the parties must surmount before proceeding to trial."
Id.
72 E. RoLPH, supra note 5, at 27.
7, Note, supra note 3, at 1044.
[VOL. 77
COURT-ANNEXED ARBTRATION
arbitration. That is, assuming the statutory qualifications (sub-
ject matter and dollar limitation) are met, the parties must
proceed to arbitration, and are usually prohibited from a judicial
trial until they do so. On the other hand, under permissive court-
annexed arbitration, parties have the option of foregoing the
arbitration hearing. While an orgamzed court-annexed arbitra-
tion program is implemented, the parties are not required to
proceed to arbitration. When drafting and constructing legisla-
tion and court rules, court-annexed arbitration designers must
decide whether to make the program mandatory or permissive
in scope. Both mandatory and permissive programs have advan-
tages and disadvantages.
The advantages of a mandatory program are as follows:
1. It will reduce case backlogs in the judicial system because
parties will be required to arbitrate their claims if they meet
the qualifications.
2. It will reduce litigation delays in the judicial system because
fewer cases will go to trial as a result of the arbitration pro-
gram.
3. The nght to jury trial is available to dissatisfied disputants
after the arbitration hearing.
One disadvantage of a mandatory program is that it may not
pass constitutional muster. Although the litigants have the op-
portumty to appeal for a trial de novo if dissatisfied with the
arbitrator's award, important constitutional issues nevertheless
permeate the concept of mandatory court-annexed arbitration.74
The advantages of a permissive program are:
1. There are no constitutional problems. By allowing the par-
ties to elect between arbitration and conventional litigation,
the constitutional issues that haunt mandatory court-annexed
arbitration are nonexistent.
2. It gives disputants the opportunity to take advantage of a
fast, efficient, fair, and economical alternative to litigation
without being required to do so.
74 See infra notes 101-77 and accompanying text.
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One disadvantage of permissive court-annexed arbitration, how-
ever, is that disputants may choose litigation over arbitration. 5
This creates two problems. First, it circumvents the very purpose
of implementing a court-annexed arbitration program. Docket
backlogs will be reduced only slightly and litigation delays will
likely continue. 76 Second, the administrative expenses of imple-
menting and maintaining court-annexed arbitration will still be
incurred, regardless of the number of participants in the pro-
gram. Thus, because of the disadvantages, the implementation
of a permissive program may prove futile.
Before inplementmg a court-annexed arbitration program,
state legislatures and courts must evaluate the needs and goals
to be accomplished by the program. Standards must be evaluated
in light of the advantages and disadvantages of a mandatory or
permissive program. All factors must be considered and the state
should choose the program that meets constitutional standards,
attains economic goals, and satisfies judicial objectives. 77
III. CONFLICTING VIEWS
When states are confronted with the adoption of court-
annexed arbitration, it is important to understand the perceived
advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis traditional litigation. These
advantages and disadvantages must be carefully weighed against
the virtues and drawbacks of traditional litigation.
A. Perceived Advantages of Court-Annexed Arbitration
There are numerous perceived advantages for the implemen-
tation of court-annexed arbitration in a judicial system. The
71 From discussions with several attorneys throughout Kentucky, the author has
learned that litigants will almost always choose litigation over arbitration. Litigants feel
more comfortable with a jury than an arbitrator. Many attorneys expressed, however,
that in small civil cases litigants may be more willing to arbitrate and forego the cost of
litigation.
16 In the early 1970's, the Los Angeles bar created a voluntary binding
arbitration program that quickly spread to other large trial court junsdic-
tions. Despite its popularity, the voluntary program was never able to draw
more than a few thousand cases per year. Under the new mandatory
arbitration program, more than 24,000 cases were diverted to arbitration
in the first year.
Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 55 n.105.
" See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text for the author's recommendations
on the type of program Kentucky should implement.
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advantages of such a program may best be implied from the
objectives which it seeks to achieve. The objectives are to:
1. Reduce congestion on the civil trial calendar by diverting
and disposing of cases through arbitration;
2. Reduce (or stabilize) court costs by reducing judicial time
spent on the civil caseload;
3. Reduce time to disposition by providing an expedited process
for arbitration-eligible cases and by removing these cases from
the trial queue, thereby reducing time to trial for other cases;
4. Reduce litigation costs for parties; and
5. Improve court access for diverse users by reducing the time
and expense required and by providing a simpler and, perhaps,
fairer form of dispute resolution.78
Indeed, these objectives set forth the unique advantages of court-
annexed arbitration and provide a guideline for the adoption of
such a program.
As mentioned above, court-annexed arbitration is fast, ef-
fective, fair, and economical when compared with traditional
litigation. 79 Arbitration awards are obtained much quicker than
court awards due to the informal nature of the proceedings. It
is also less expensive to reach judgments through court-annexed
arbitration than the judicial system "since costs consist primarily
of administrative and arbitration fees." 80 This is important be-
cause "[a]t a time when expenditure control is critical to tight
budgets, court-annexed arbitration has proven inviting to state
and local governments.""' As such, it is supported by state
legislatures and courts as a means to solve the growing problems
of court congestion and budgeting because "by diverting smaller
civil cases to a presumably faster and cheaper dispute resolution
process, courts can handle their remaining cases more expedi-
tiously, and spend less money overall." 82 Therein lies one of the
78 Note, supra note 20, at 396 n.16 (citing Hensler, What We Know and Don't
Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270, 275 (1986)).
79 Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 53.
10 Id. at 54. "Large capital expenditures for buildings, as well as high overhead
for maintenance and judicial personnel, are not required because court-annexed arbitra-
tion hearings are generally held in the arbitrator's office." Id.
91 Id.
' E. RoH , supra note 5, at v.
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great advantages of court-annexed arbitration-through the im-
plementation of one program, two growing problems, court
congestion and litigation costs, could be alleviated.
Another advantage of court-annexed arbitration is that the
program will likely have a positive impact on the public's attitude
and perception of the judicial system. Court-annexed arbitration
may "reduce the popular dissatisfaction with existing dispute
resolution methods. A system designed to speed the resolution
of disputes by minimizing the time spent arguing about proce-
dure and maximizing the time spent arguing the merits should
increase the public's satisfaction with the system." 83
Furthermore, court-annexed arbitration awards may help
promote the settlement of cases for two reasons. First, "[e]ven
if the parties reject the arbitration award and request a trial de
novo, the arbitration award may stimulate settlement before trial
because it provides the parties with a neutral evaluation of the
case's value."18 4 The parties may view the arbitration award as a
sensible, rational evaluation, thus promoting realistic settlement
negotiations. Second, appealing for a trial de novo after an
arbitration hearing will likely lead to increased expenses for the
parties (i.e. legal fees). Rather than incur these additional ex-
penses and take the added risk of an unfavorable verdict from
a jury, many parties may opt to settle the case.
Court-annexed arbitration may also be advantageous to in-
digent and pro se litigants who cannot afford an attorney or
whose claims are "too small to justify the costs of litigation." 5
This program would give these litigants their "day in court"
which they nght not be able to obtain otherwise. This result
will likely have a positIve impact on the public's attitude and
perception of the judicial system in this country
11 Note, supra note 3, at 1060. See Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, The Relation Between
Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REv 1401, 1419-20 (1983) (improving
judicial procedures is an "effective way to improve the public perception of the justice
system"); see also Simom, supra note 1, at 246 ("The primary goal of court-annexed
arbitration is to reduce litigation delays in ordinary civil cases without diminishing the
actual or apparent quality of justice.").
94 Id. at 250.
1S Note, supra note 3, at 1040 (the author argues that court-annexed arbitration
gives those with small claims the opportunity to gain more easily the benefits derived
from the ability to litigate claims).
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B. Perceived Disadvantages of Court-Annexed Arbitration
While the advantages of court-annexed arbitration are nu-
merous, several perceived disadvantages do exist.
First and foremost, there are several problematic constitu-
tional issues. Court-annexed arbitration could infringe upon the
right to a jury trial,86 create an unlawful delegation of judicial
power, 17 and contravene the due process and equal protection
clauses of a particular jurisdiction's constitution.8 These consti-
tutional concerns must be addressed before implementing court-
annexed arbitration.
Also, the common law principle of stare decisis is lost in
court-annexed arbitration, since the decisions "are specific to
one dispute and have no precedential value." 89 It is argued that
the lack of stare decisis could cause arbitrators' awards to be
arbitrary and capncious. This, in turn, may cause court-annexed
arbitration to be viewed as an inconsistent way to resolve dis-
putes.
Another perceived disadvantage is that "litigants with smaller
civil disputes may be relegated to 'second-class' justice.'' 9° Since
court-annexed arbitration programs are typically geared to small
civil disputes, it may cause small-claim litigants to feel they are
" For a discussion of the infringement upon the litigant's nght to jury trial, see
infra notes 102-34 and accompanying text.
" For a discussion on the constitutional issue of unlawful delegation of judicial
power, see infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
u For a discussion of due process and equal protection clause issues, see infra
notes 147-77 and accompanying text.
9 Note, supra note 2, at 1745.
Arbitration, therefore, lacks the legal rules developed incrementally through
relevant cases that, in traditional adjudication, legitimize past decisions
and render future decisions more predictable. Contracting parties can better
plan their behavior according to clear and consistent legal rules as long as
the parties are aware of the decisions and understand the rationale behind
the ruling.
If enough cases are diverted to arbitration, this rulemaking power
exercised by the courts may be hindered. Besides functiomng to resolve
disputes, which arbitration also accomplishes quite well, litigation facilitates
the development of a body of law and related rules that 'serve to guide
society.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9 Note, supra note 20, at 411.
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inferior to large-claim litigants, thus causing dissatisfaction with
arbitrators' awards.
It is also argued that court-annexed arbitration may not be
an economically efficient alternative to litigation. Substantial
costs arise in the implementation of a court-annexed arbitration
program. States generally pay the arbitrators' fees. Administra-
tive personnel are needed to "assign arbitrators, issue notices,
and monitor compliance with established timetables." 91 Since the
arbitration alternative will likely result in a large arbitration
docket, additional administrative complexities will arise, making
the need for competent personnel very important. 92 These poten-
tial costs could become overwhelrmng if a program is not prop-
erly organized and implemented. Furthermore, court-annexed
arbitration may actually increase litigation costs to disputants.
The parties will incur expenses to prepare for the arbitration
hearing. If dissatisfied with the award, they may appeal for a
jury trial, thus incurring the additional expense of traditional
litigation. Therefore, it is possible for a party to fall victim to
"double expenses," arbitration costs and litigation costs.
Another perceived disadvantage is the belief that court-an-
nexed arbitration may not reduce the backlogs facing our court
systems. But rather it would become an additional step or hurdle
to overcome before litigation. 93 Also, many feel court-annexed
arbitration programs have the potential for abuse by disputants.
For example, since court-annexed arbitration programs typically
set monetary limitations (usually $10,000 or less) on the cases to
be arbitrated, a party may inflate the value of his or her claim
to avoid arbitration.9 4 Finally, many litigants may feel arbitrators
are not as skilled as judges to rule on issues of law and fact.
91 Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 537, 545 (1983).
92 Id.
11 "In cases seen to be very important to the litigants-whether for monetary
reasons or otherwise-losing parties are rarely willing to accept the result of arbitration
as long as trial de novo remains available and they have so little to lose by resorting to
full-blown litigation." Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea orAnethema?,
99 HARv L. REv-668, 674 (1986).
94 "Although the arbitration rules permit the court to look behind the pleadings
and determine whether exaggerated claims have been made to avoid arbitration, the
courts do not do so; in practice, courts determine eligibility solely on the basis of the
parties' pleadings." Simom, supra note 1, at 266.
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This could potentially create a lack of confidence among dis-
putants in the arbitrator's decision and award.
IV EVALUATING PROMINENT CONCERNS
The perceived disadvantages of court-annexed arbitration set
out above must be carefully considered before implementing a
program. An analysis of the practical concerns and problematic
constitutional questions surrounding court-annexed arbitration
follows. Emphasis will be placed on how to deal with these
concerns when structuring a court-annexed arbitration program.
A. Practical Concerns
One practical concern involves the loss of stare decisis in
court-annexed arbitration. Arbitrators typically are not required
to elaborate on the rationale behind an award, nor are they
required to write judicial opinions. In Sobel v Hertz, Warner
& Co., 95 the Second Circuit stated that "forcing arbitrators to
explain their award will unjustifiably diminish whatever
efficiency the process now achieves." ' 96 Therefore, efficiency out-
weighs the concern for lack of precedential value in arbitration
awards. Furthermore, the arbitrators consider all relevant sub-
stantive law when rendering their decisions so that arbitration
awards are issued with the guidance of well-defined legal prin-
ciples. Arbitrators' awards, therefore, will not be arbitrary and
capricious if they are well-grounded in legal reasoning.
Another concern is the belief that small-claim litigants will
fall victim to "second-class" justice if subjected to court-an-
nexed arbitration. Studies conducted by the Institute for Civil
Justice, however, show that litigants are satisfied with court-
annexed arbitration and do not perceive themselves as being
relegated to second-class status.Y
' 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1215. This rationale was upheld in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus-
tries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986), where the
Eighth Circuit held that "to allow a court to conclude that it may substitute its own
judgment for the arbitrator's whenever the arbitrator chooses not to explain the award
would improperly subvert the proper functioning of the arbitral process." Id. at 750.
97 Individual litigants who bring cases to arbitration in Pittsburgh have very
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There is also the concern that the economic costs of court-
annexed arbitration are too high to justify its adoption. First,
there is the issue of compensating the arbitrator. This is not a
great concern, however, as most arbitrator's fees are mmimal.9
Further, it has been suggested that perhaps attorneys could act
as arbitrators on a pro bono basis. There is also some concern
about additional costs that will result from hiring needed ad-
mlnistrative personnel. These costs, however, can easily be held
to a minimum with a properly organized program. Furthermore,
if court-annexed arbitration were not implemented, these addi-
tional costs would likely occur in the traditional judicial system
because administrative expenses would rise due to increased court
congestion and case backlogs. Finally, many are concerned that
litigants will fall victim to both arbitration costs and litigation
costs since most dissatisfied parties will appeal their arbitration
award, seeing arbitration as an additional step before litigation.
This argument assumes, however, that parties will not agree with
the arbitrator's award and will appeal for a trial de novo. Studies
have shown that such an assumption is not valid. 99 Also, many
litigants settle their disputes based on the arbitrator's award,
simple requirements: They want a speedy, inexpensive procedure that pro-
vides a full hearing of their dispute before an impartial third party, and
an opportunity to challenge if the outcome proves unacceptable. They are
generally indifferent to the qualifications of the third-party adjudicators as
long as they are neutral, and to the setting in which the hearing is held.
But they appreciate the informality and privacy of the arbitration process.
Most of those we interviewed found that their requirements were met.
Institutional litigants who depend upon the arbitration program for
routine resolution of large numbers of civil suits also have rather simple
requirements. They too want a speedy, inexpensive procedure, but they are
less sensitive than individual litigants to the qualitative aspects of the
hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the
outcomes it delivers. They attribute unfavorable outcomes to the judgment
of the arbitrators, not to the lack of opportunity for discovery or for
cross-examining witnesses, or to the absence of other attributes of the trial
process.
Note, supra note 20, at 411 (quoting SIMPLE JUsTICE, supra note 22, at 83).
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text. In Illinois, the arbitrator's fee is $200
per day or $100 per half day. Lerner, Mandatory Arbitration: Welcome to illinots, 76
ILL. B.J. 418, 422 (Apr. 1988).
9 In Pennsylvania, "[o]nly nine percent of the cases subject to court-annexed
arbitration are appealed to a trial de novo and only forty percent of these ultimately
proceed to a full trial." Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 54.
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thus no appeal is necessary Furthermore, since most states
implement disincentives to appeal into their program, litigants
will be less likely to appeal for a trial de novo. For these reasons,
court-annexed arbitration will not likely create double expenses
for litigants, nor will it act as a mere additional step before
litigation.
A final concern facing proponents of court-annexed arbitra-
tion is the perception that arbitrators are not as skilled as judges.
To solve this problem, a program should be implemented to
"train potential neutrals to ensure their expertise in both sub-
stantive areas of the law and in dispute resolution techniques."'' 10
B. Constitutional Concerns
The concept of court-annexed arbitration raises the consti-
tutional issues of infringement of right to trial by jury, unlawful
delegation of judicial power, and violations of procedural due
process and equal protection.10 1 An analysis of these issues is
necessary when considering whether Kentucky, or any other
jurisdiction, should adopt court-annexed arbitration as an alter-
native to litigation.
1. Right to Jury Trial
One of the most protected rights given to citizens of this
country is the seventh amendment right to trial by jury 102 Al-
though there are many advantages and disadvantages to a trial
by jury, 103 this right has been an extremely important part of
100 Edwards, supra note 93, at 683 (emphasis added).
0I Note, supra note 3, at 1045. For a discussion of the constitutional issues
involving right to jury trial, see mnfra notes 102-34 and accompanying text; unlawful
delegation of judicial power, see infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text; procedural
due process, see infra notes 147-61 and accompanying text; and equal protection, see
infra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides in full: "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
tnal.by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than accordihg to the rules of the common law."
Id.
1o See, e.g., Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV 1055, 1057-68
(1964) (Kalven discusses the quality of junes); Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case for
Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINoS L.J. 1, 33-35 (1976) (Kane argues for a functional
approach to issue of trial by jury).
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the American judicial system since its inception in 1791. With
mandatory court-annexed arbitration, however, this right could
be in jeopardy because a party is required to arbitrate. 1°4 If the
program is permissive in scope, 105 the right is not affected since
the parties may elect to arbitrate or go to trial. Therefore, for
the purposes of discussion, this section will assume that a juris-
diction has adopted a mandatory court-annexed program.
There are two issues surrounding mandatory court-annexed
arbitration and its possible encroachment on the right to trial
by jury "Since mandatory arbitration programs typically pro-
vide for the right to a de novo rehearing with a jury, the issues
are whether a mandatory arbitration requirement prior to a de
novo trial and the financial disincentives to seeking a de novo
trial violate a party's right to a jury trial." 106 Does mandatorily
subjecting parties to arbitration before affording them the right
to a jury trial, in itself, violate this constitutional right? If not,
does placing financial disincentives upon parties wishing to ap-
peal for a jury trial create such a burden as to violate the
constitution? These questions have been the subject of much
litigation in jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory pro-
grams.
These issues were discussed in the landmark case of Appli-
cation of Smith.107 In that case, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania decided whether the state's mandatory arbitration program
violated a litigant's constitutional right to trial by jury 103 The
court held that only where the arbitrators' decision is the "final
,04 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
105 Id.
'0 Note, supra note 3, at 1045.
107 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wessler, 350 U.S.
858 (1955).
108 Note, supra note 3, at 1045. Briefly, the facts of Application of Smith are as
follows:
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania had adopted a local rule of court requiring
all actions involving $500 or less, with certain exceptions, to go to com-
pulsory arbitration. Arbitrators' fees were set at $25 each (for a total of
$75), except in protracted cases. Smith, who had a $249.19 claim, petitioned
for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania claiung
the act as amended and the implementing rules unreasonably burdened his
right to jury trial.
Walker, supra note 10, at 915.
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determination of the rights of the parties" is the right to jury
trial violated by mandatory court-annexed arbitration. 1°9 If the
parties are allowed to appeal the decision of the arbitrator,
"there is no denial of the right of trial by jury "110 Therefore,
in Smith, the court ruled that mandatory court-annexed arbitra-
tion programs granting parties the right to appeal for a jury
trial are constitutional. Courts throughout the United States have
uniformly upheld this view "I
A litigant's right to trial by jury may also be violated by
imposing financial disincentives on his demand for a trial de
novo.112 These disincentives may create an "impermissible bur-
den" on the right to trial by jury 13 There are differing inter-
pretations as to what constitutes an impermissible burden: "(1)
any and all financial disincentives constitute an impermissible
burden; (2) only excessive financial disincentives constitute such
a burden; and (3) such financial disincentives never constitute
an impermissible burden." '" 4 In Smith, the court suggested a
"test" to be used when determining what restrictions on the
right to appeal for trial de novo nght be unconstitutional. The
court suggested that "the right of appeal for the purpose of
presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the
imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which
would make the right practically unavailable.""' The question
209 Smith, 112 A.2d at 629. "The only purpose of the constitutional provision is to
secure the right of trial by jury before rights of person or property are finally deter-
mined." Id. (emphasis in original).
120 Id.
M See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F Supp. 712, 714 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F Supp. 566, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Davison
v. Siana Hosp. of Baltimore, 462 F Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978); Deibeikis v. Link-
Belt Co., 104 N.E. 211 (1914); Am. Umversal Ins. Co. v. Del Greco, 530 A.2d 171, 178
(1987); Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 66 (1978); Christie-Lambert
Van & Storage Co. v. McLeod, 693 P.2d 161, 166 (Wash. App. 1984). These cases
provide a discussion of mandatory court-annexed arbitration and the right to trial by
jury. Application of Smith gives these courts the basis for their rationale in upholding
these programs as constitutional, provided parties are given the opportunity to appeal
for a jury trial.
12 Note, supra note 3, at 1046. For a discussion of the types of financial disincen-
tives that may be placed on parties, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
M Note, supra note 3, at 1046.
224 Id. at 1046-47.
22I Smith, 112 A.2d at 629 (emphasis added). The court held the following were
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then becomes what constitutes an "onerous condition, restriction
or regulation" that is an unconstitutional burden on the right
to appeal for a trial by jury 116 Although the answer to this
question is not simple, there are several factors to be considered
in its resolution. These factors include "the amount at issue in
the dispute, the particular costs assessed, and the financial status
of the would-be appellant."'1 7 To resolve this issue, "[t]he ques-
tion is not strictly a matter of choosing an amount, but rather
one of striking a balance between preventing arbitration from
becoming merely a preamble to a jury trial, and effectively
preserving that right.""1 " In other words, the disincentives must
be onerous enough to deter frivolous appeals for jury trial, yet
not so burdensome to prevent legitimate appeals. Striking a
balance between the interests of the litigants' right to a jury trial
and the interests of the state in admimstering a less burdensome,
cost-effective judicial system "compels an assessment of the
desirability of enacting laws designed to discourage people from
exercising their constitutionally protected rights." 119 Before a
jurisdiction adopts a mandatory court-annexed arbitration pro-
gram, it must "strike a balance" between these two competing
interests or the program could be held unconstitutional.
Several courts have specifically addressed this issue since the
Smith decision. In Kimbrough v Holiday Inn,120 the Eastern
not "onerous conditions"- (1) requirement of the payment of costs before the entry of
an appeal in order to obtain a jury trial; and (2) requirement of the payment of a jury
fee in advance of trial. Id. at 629-30. The court noted, however, that the problem "is
one of degree rather than kind." Id. at 630 (emphasis added). Therefore, the question
is not really the type of financial disincentive placed upon these parties, but the amount
of the disincentive. The disincentive should be in proportion to the size of the claim.
The court in Smith made note of this fact when it held that arbitration programs "should
provide for a lower rate of compensation where only a comparatively small claim is
involved." Id. Justice Bell, in his dissent, states that "[s]mall, reasonable, unburdensome
fees and costs are valid and may be imposed by statute or rules of Court." Id. at 633
(Bell, J., dissenting). It seems that these types of financial disincentives would not create
an "onerous condition" on the right to jury trial, and thus would be constitutional.
116 Note, supra note 3, at 1047
117 Id. As mentioned supra in note 115, these factors all concern the degree or
proportion of the financial disincentive. This seems to be the most important factor,
and not the kind of disincentive.
"8 Note, supra note 3, at 1047.
119 Id.
12 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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District of P'ennsylvama upheld the constitutionality of a local
mandatory arbitration rule that required a party to pay arbitra-
tion fees and interest on the award if he or she appeals for jury
trial and fails to improve his or her position. 21 The court held
this disincentive to appeal did not impose such an onerous
condition as to violate the right to jury trial. 12 The court,
therefore, "struck a balance" that was constitutionally valid. In
Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co. v McLeod,'2 the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals held that "the assessment of attorney
fees against an appellant who does not improve his position
in the trial de novo does not unconstitutionally restrict his jury
trial right."''24 Consistent with the Smith court, the McLeod
court cautioned that "the problem is one of degree rather than
kind." 1' The disincentive should be in proportion to the size of
the claim if the proper balance is to be struck. In Opinion of
the Justices126 the disincentive was burdensome and unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon the party's right to jury trial. In that
case the New Hampshire Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statutory disincentive requiring the payment of $750 or $1,125
in arbitrators' fees as a prerequisite to a jury trial appeal of a
case involving $3,000 or less.127 Again, the size of the claim
involved was a determining factor in holding the disincentive
unconstitutional. These cases present instances where courts have
analyzed the issue of financial disincentives and "struck the
balance" required in determining the constitutionality of a court-
annexed arbitration program.
It is important to understand that since the seventh amend-
ment right to trial by jury in civil actions is not incorporated
into the fourteenth amendments' 28 state constitutional law gov-
"I1 Id. at 571. "IT]he arbitration system created by Local Rule 49 does not impose
conditions so burdensome or so onerous that it interferes with the rights guaranteed by
the Seventh Amendment." Id.
' Id.
123 693 P.2d 161 (Wash. App. 1984).
124 Id. at 167.
123 Id.
" 304 A.2d 881 (N.H. 1973).
127 Id. at 887.
121 Note, supra note 3, at 1045; see Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S.
226, 232 (1923).
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erns this issue. Most states, however, have a provision in their
constitution preserving a person's right to trial by jury.12 9 Thus,
it becomes a matter of state constitutional interpretation to
determine whether mandatory court-annexed arbitration violates
a person's right to jury trial.3 0
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that a trial
by jury "shall be held sacred." ' In Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights v Fraser,3 2 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
interpreted this section as "simply preserv[ing] [the jury trial
right] as it already existed under the common law, 113 3 and not
creating a jury trial right. Thus, if the right to a jury trial existed
at common law for a particular cause of action, then that right
is preserved by section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The court provided a "test" to determine when section 7 of
the Kentucky Constitution applies. Its applicability, the court
reasoned, "depends on the nature of the right and the nature
of the forum.' ' 34 While the court said that common-law actions
were of the right "nature," it failed to indicate what types of
forums would be of the right "nature" to require application
of section 7 Because of the court's ambiguity regarding this
matter, it is unresolved whether arbitration is the type of forum
to which the court was referring.
2. Unlawful Delegation of Judicial Power
Court-annexed arbitration also raises the constitutional issue
of whether these programs are an unlawful delegation of judicial
power.1 35 Like the right to jury trial, this involves an interpre-
tation of state constitutional law It applies to both mandatory
129 Note, supra note 3, at 1045.
130 Id.
131 Ky. CONST. § 7. Section seven provides in full: "The ancient mode of trial by
jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such
modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution." Id.
-- 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981).
133 Id. at 854. "Neither the seventh amendment nor Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution creates a jury trial right. Both, by their terms, simply preserve that right
as it already existed under the common law." Id., see also Mays v. Dept. For Human
Resources, 656 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Ky. App. 1983).
I- Fraser, 625 S.W.2d at 854.
" Note, supra note 3, at 1048.
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and permissive arbitration programs,'36 however, because "[t]he
issue is whether requiring parties to have a nonjudge determine
issues of fact and law in the resolution of disputes violates state
constitutional provisions vesting judicial power in the judici-
ary "137 The threshold question is whether arbitrators in court-
annexed arbitration proceedings are performing a "judicial func-
tion" in violation of the state constitution.3 8 At first glance,
one could rationally conclude that arbitrators are performing
judicial functions. They have the power to render judgments
that are binding on the parties if an appeal is not requested.
The arbitrators are not given final judicial power, however, since
a tral de novo can be obtained by dissatisfied litigants. There-
fore, the final judicial power lies in the judiciary, 13 9 and court-
annexed arbitration programs providing an appeal for trial by
jury probably do not create an unlawful delegation of judicial
power. 14
This issue was recently addressed by the Supreme Court of
Alaska in Keyes v Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc.141 The Alaska
court declined to invalidate a state statute vesting judicial power
in nonjudicial personnel. 142 While Keyes involved medical mal-
practice pretrial advisory panel decisions, the court's rationale
easily applies to court-annexed arbitration programs.
Section 109 of the Kentucky Constitution establishes the
court system of the state of Kentucky 143 This provision vests
136 Id. "Article III of the United States Constitution, wich vests the judicial power
of the United States in the judiciary, applies only to the judicial power of the United
States and does not address the judicial power of the states." Id.
137 Id.
13S Id.
"3 The holding in Smith, 112 A.2d 625, seems to uphold this view. The court
states, "[t]he only purpose of the constitutional provision is to secure the right of trial
by jury before rights of person or property are finally determined." Id. at 629 (emphasis
in original).
' See, e.g., Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 357 (Alaska
1988) (declimng to invalidate a state statute on the ground that it contravenes the
separation of powers principles by vesting judicial power in nonjudicial personnel);
Attorney Gen. of Md., 385 A.2d at 65 (Md. 1978) (holding that the decision of an
arbitration panel is not a final determination of the case since either party may appeal
for jury trial).
, 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
2 Id. at 357.
141 Ky. CoNsr. § 109.
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exclusive judicial power "in one Court of Justice which shall be
divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court
of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court, and a trial
court of linuted jurisdiction known as the District Court. ' ' 44
This section would seem to indicate that any type of judicial
power vested in another admmstrative body would violate the
Kentucky Constitution. The Kentucky Supreme Court, however,
held in Reeves v Simons 45 that an act does not violate section
109 because it vests quasi-judicial power in an admimstrative
board, provided judicial review is allowed in the action. 146 A
court-annexed arbitration program, therefore, would not be vi-
olative of this section, provided that the parties are given the
right to appeal to a jury trial.
3. Procedural Due Process
Court-annexed arbitration raises the procedural due process
issue of "whether a procedural system that forces people to go
through arbitration before proceeding, as a matter of right, to
de novo rehearing satisfies the requirements for a full and fair
opportunity to litigate."1 47 In Keyes, the Alaska Supreme Court
found "[d]ue process is satisfied if the statutory procedures
provide an opportunity to be heard in court at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."1 48 Thus, with both parties
having the right to an attorney, the right to notice, the oppor-
tumty to submit evidence, and the right to appeal for a trial de
novo, it seems that court-annexed arbitration would meet the
mimmum requirements of procedural due process. This is a
logical conclusion considering the number of states with court-
1,, Id.
160 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1942).
146 In the Keller case, it was written there is no constitutional objection to
an administrative board ascertaining facts and admlmstenng the law; that
although it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, it is not exercising judicial
power within the meaning of the Constitution forbidding one branch of
government from usurping the functions of another. Section 2554b-147
makes a provision for a judicial review of the Board's action.
Id. at 150; see Keller v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 130 S.W.2d 821 (Ky.
1939).
147 Note, supra note 3, at 1049.
,41 Keyes, 750 P.2d at 353 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
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annexed arbitration programs that have been held constitutional.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Application of Smith,149
stated that there is a conflict between court-annexed arbitration
and due process, but this conflict is dissipated when the right to
appeal for jury trial is preserved to litigants. 150
However, this is only half of the picture. Litigants' oppor-
tunity to be heard may be foreclosed if the arbitration hearing
has exhausted their financial resources. 15 A dissatisfied litigant
may not be able to afford an appeal for trial de novo, which in
effect denies the party a right to a jury trial. In turn, this denies
the litigant a full and fair opportunity to litigate and could be
a violation of due process. The United States Supreme Court,
in Boddie v Connecticut,5 2 held "that a statute or a rule may
be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to
deprive an individual of a protected right although its general
validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state
power is beyond question."' 5  Thus, a statute or rule providing
for mandatory court-annexed arbitration may deprive an indi-
gent litigant of his right to jury trial. The litigant simply cannot
afford to appeal, thus foreclosing the opportunity to be heard.
This situation can be easily remedied, however, by waiving the
costs of an appeal for indigent parties as Illinois' program does.' 15 4
Procedural due process is provided to the citizens of Ken-
tucky in Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution'55 which "pro-
hibits the exercise of arbitrary power over the 'lives, liberty and
"49 112 A.2d 625.
' Smith, 112 A.2d at 629; see also Kremer v. Chemucal Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461 (1982). The United States Supreme Court held that "no single model of procedural
fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 483. The Court further stated that "[w]e have no hesitation in concluding that
this panoply of procedures, complemented by adminstrative as well as judicial review,
is sufficient under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 484.
"I Note, supra note 3, at 1050 n.74.
.12 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
" Id. at 379.
1-, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 93(a) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. at ch. 110, para.
2-1004A.
'" Ky. CoNsT. § 2. Section 2 provides in full: "Absolute and arbitrary power over




property' of the citizens of the Commonwealth." '" 6 In Kaelin v
City of Louisville, 57 the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that
"constitutional due process requires a trial type hearing for the
purpose of determining the adjudicative facts necessary to decide
the issue." 158 While holding that "the right of cross-examination
is required by due process of law,"' 59 the court listed other
procedural elements that must be part of a proceeding. The
requisite elements include "a hearing, the taking and weighing
of evidence, a finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the
evidence and conclusions supported by substantial evidence."' 60
If all of these procedural elements are available in a court-
annexed arbitration program, it would probably be consistent
with the procedural due process requirement of Section 2.161
4. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 62 This
clause was enacted to prevent states from practicing unjustifiable
discrimination against people within a state. The equal protection
analysis usually involves a two-tier scheme, with courts applying
one of two standards-strict scrutiny or rational basis. Strict
scrutiny is used whenever a state statute applies to a "suspect
classification" or limits a "fundamental right.' ' 63 Otherwise, the
- Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1983) (quoting KY.
CoNsT. § 2).
643 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1983).
'38 Id. at 591 (citing City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971)).
,' Id. at 592. "We hold that, in a trial-type adjudicatory hearing before an
adminstrative body, the right of cross-examination is required by due process of law."
Id.
Id. at 591.
,61 Of course, if a court-annexed arbitration program provides for the right of
appeal for a jury trial, these procedural elements will be available to litigants on appeal.
162 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
163 Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172 (5th Cir. 1979). Suspect
classes include race, alienage, and ancestry, just to name a few. Fundamental rights are
those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41.1 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Such rights include privacy,
marriage, and the right to vote. While the Supreme Court has not held the right to a
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rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review 164
A state statute adopting mandatory court-annexed arbitration
could be discriminatory if litigants of small civil claims are
required to arbitrate, whereas litigants of large civil claims are
not subject to mandatory arbitration. Thus, a litigant is receiving
unequal treatment due to a classification made by a state law
This unequal treatment could violate the equal protection clause.
The question then becomes which standard of review should be
applied to a state law requiring arbitration of certain claims:
strict scrutiny or rational basis?
It is argued that a state law implementing a mandatory court-
annexed arbitration program infringes on the exercise of the
right to trial by jury 165 Since the right to jury trial is a funda-
mental right, 66 this state law should be subjected to the strict
scrutiny test.1 67 It must be noted that "[s]tatutes subjected to
strict scrutiny have frequently been found to violate equal pro-
tection."' 68 Therefore, if a mandatory court-annexed arbitration
jury trial to be a fundamental right, when confronted with this issue it certainly would
hold that it is among those rights. The right to jury trial is "explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution" in the Seventh Amendment. Therefore, under the reasomng of San
Antonio, it is a fundamental right. Maryland held the right to jury trial was fundamental
in Davidson v. Miller, 344 A.2d 422, 431-32 (Md. 1975).
'64 While the Supreme Court has formally adopted only the strict scrutiny and
rational basis tests, the Court has openly taken an intermediate approach to reviewing
a limited group of classifications. In cases involving discrimination based on gender or
legitimacy, a mid-level or intermediate scrutiny is used. In 1988, in a unammous opinion,
the Court stated that illegitimacy classifications, like gender classifications, were subject
to intermediate scrutiny and, therefore, such classifications "must be substantially related
to an important governmental objective." Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
" See Attorney Gen. of Md., 385 A.2d at 77. In this case, the Bar Association
argued that a health care malpractice claims statute, which required submission of certain
medical malpractice claims to arbitration panel, was an infringement on the right to jury
trial.
. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
267 The strict scrutiny test has been described as follows: "When a statutory clas-
sification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the test was set forth as follows: "Where
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." Id. at 155 (citations omitted). Thus, the classification must be necessary to
promote a compelling state interest before it will be valid under the strict scrutiny test.
I" Woods, 591 F.2d at 1172.
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statute were subjected to the strict scrutiny test, it could be held
unconstitutional. This analysis assumes, of course, that manda-
tory court-annexed arbitration infringes upon the right to trial
by jury As discussed above, this assumption may be un-
founded. 169
Mandatory court-annexed arbitration programs provide the
right to appeal for a jury trial. This right to appeal, however,
will not in itself avoid a possible infringement on a right to jury
trial. If financial disincentives on the right to appeal become
"onerous conditions," then the right to jury trial may be in-
fringed upon.' 70 If these disincentives are reasonable and not
"onerous conditions," then there is no infringement on the right
to jury trial. 171 Therefore, a mandatory court-annexed arbitration
program providing the right to appeal for a jury trial and
invoking disincentives that are reasonable and unburdensome
does not infringe upon the right to trial by jury A state statute
implementing such a program would not be subject to strict
scrutiny, but rather would be evaluated under a rational basis
test. 172 In Attorney General of Maryland v Johnson, 73 the Mar-
yland Court of Appeals addressed this issue and held that once
you have "established that the statutory classification in no
way deprives, infringes, or interferes with the free exercise of
the right to a civil jury trial," then the statute is subject to a
rational basis standard. 74
In applying the traditional rational basis test to a state law
implementing mandatory court-annexed arbitration, it is appar-
"6 See supra notes 102-34 and accompanying text.
370 See Smith, 112 A.2d at 629. "All that is required is that the right of appeal for
the purpose of presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the imposition
of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which would make the right practically
unavailable." Id.
,' Id. at 633. "Small, reasonable, unburdensome fees and costs are valid and may
be imposed by statute or rules of Court." Id.
72 "Under the rational basis test, the question is whether the classification estab-
lished by mandatory arbitration laws rationally furthers a legitimate state interest."
Note, supra note 3, at 1051-52. Courts in every jurisdiction "have uniformly declined
to apply a 'stnct scrutiny' standard of review, most finding explicitly that the statute's
classification neither implicates a suspect class nor impinges upon any fundamental right
which would justify this higher standard." Keyes, 750 P.2d at 357.




ent that the distinction between small-claim and large-claim lit-
igants is reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the state
law, namely to provide fast, effective, fair, and econonucal
adjudication while reducing court backlogs and litigation delays.
A state law providing such a program, therefore, does not violate
the equal protection clause.
Section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution provides equal pro-
tection to all citizens of the Commonwealth.17 5 In Fischer v
Grieb,176 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that section 3 does
"not forbid classification based on reasonable and natural dis-
tinctions, but the rule is otherwise where the classification is
mamfestly so arbitrary and unreasonable as to impose a burden
upon, or exclude one or more of a class without reasonable
basis in fact. 11 77 This is the standard of review applicable in
Kentucky to a state law creating a mandatory court-annexed
arbitration program. This standard should not pose a constitu-
tional barrier to the implementation of court-annexed arbitration
in Kentucky
V A PROGRAM FOR KENTUCKY
When making decisions about the adoption of court-annexed
arbitration in Kentucky, program designers must consider the
competing interests mentioned above and not lose sight of their
ultimate objectives: to speed disposition of cases so as to reduce
court congestion, to save money, and most importantly, to pro-
vide litigants with an equitable adjudicatory process while avoid-
ing the possibility of abridging constitutional rights and
protections. With this in mind, Kentucky must adopt its own
program of court-annexed arbitration, as there is no "cookbook
featuring a single recipe" to fit all jurisdictions. 7s The single
most important objective, however, is to create a positive atti-
tude about the program throughout the legal and non-legal
115 Ky. CONST. § 3. The relevant part of Section 3 provides that "[a]ll men, when
they form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public
emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration
of public services." Id.
176 113 S.W.2d 1139 (Ky. 1938).
Id. at 1140.
it E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at iii.
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community 171 If lawyers and litigants find the program benefi-
cial, they will continue to use it, and this will enhance confidence
in court-annexed arbitration.
A. Mandatory or Permissive Program?
A threshold question for Kentucky program designers is
whether the state's court-annexed arbitration program should be
mandatory or permissive. 180 Adoption of a mandatory program
will serve the goals of reducing case backlogs and litigation
delays, thus providing expeditious adjudication and dimmshing
the cost of litigation for parties. Mandatory court-annexed ar-
bitration, however, is faced with a major obstacle-constitution-
ality 181 Alternatively, if a permissive program is adopted, there
is no constitutional impediment. Permissive court-annexed arbi-
tration, however, will not likely serve the goals of court-annexed
arbitration set out above.
Although the arguments regarding each type of program are
meritorious, Kentucky should adopt a mandatory court-annexed
arbitration program. 8 2 Considering the growing problems of
court congestion, litigation delays, and frustrations among at-
torneys, judges and litigants, Kentucky's interest in eliminating
these problems through a mandatory program is substantial and
legitimate. The advantages of a mandatory program far outweigh
those of a permissive program. A mandatory program directly
confronts and alleviates the problems facing this state's judicial
system. It satisfies the needs of the state and promotes the goals
of the judicial system.
"I' "The keys to the ultimate success of court-[annexed] arbitration, or any alter-
native dispute resolution program are not the high-quality rules or institutions that
admimster the programs but the participants and the use they make of the programs."
Walker, supra note 10, at 943.
ISO The difference between mandatory and permissive court-annexed arbitration is
simple. In a mandatory program the parties are required to arbitrate their dispute.
Whereas, in a permissive program the parties elect whether or not to arbitrate.
"I See supra notes 101-77 and accompanying text.
"1 To meet judicial objectives, a two-tier approach has been suggested, i.e., that
"entry into court-annexed arbitration be mandated for most types of civil actions
involving a claim for less than a statutory amount of damages, eg. $15,000 and be
permitted by voluntary election of the parties respecting claims exceeding the statutory
limit." Snow and Abramson, supra note 6, at 57. Kentucky, however, should implement
a completely mandatory program.
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The major problem confronting a mandatory program is
whether it will pass constitutional muster. The designers of a
mandatory program must give this issue careful consideration.
A mandatory program providing the right to appeal for a jury
trial and placing unburdensome, reasonable financial disincen-
tives on this right to appeal, will likely be held constitutional by
Kentucky courts. 83 The most important consideration in struc-
turing the disincentive policy is "decid[ing] what disincentives to
adopt, when to apply them, and how to ensure the disincentives-
are applied. They must make these decisions bearing in mind
their objectives: limiting the appeal rate and conforming to
constitutional requirements."' 1 Kentucky should adopt a disin-
centive policy consistent with the requirements held constitution-
ally valid in Application of Smith,"8 5 and Kimbrough v Holiday
Inn. ' 6 The disincentive should be in proportion to the size of
the claim involved because the question is not really the type of
disincentive placed upon the parties, but the amount. After
evaluating the needs and goals to be accomplished in light of
the advantages and disadvantages of a mandatory program,
Kentucky should adopt mandatory court-annexed arbitration be-
cause it satisfies the constitutional standards, attains the eco-
nomic goals, and meets the judicial objectives of the state of
Kentucky
B. Content of the Program
Another question confronting Kentucky's program designers
is the content of the mandatory program.8 7 Program designers
must decide how detailed the specific provisions of the program
-' This would make the Kentucky program similar to the Pennsylvania program
wuch was held constitutional in Application of Smith, 112 A.2d.625 (Pa. 1955), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
114 E. RoLPH, supra note 5, at viii.
5 112 A.2d 625.
M 478 F Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
"7 A detailed analysis of what a mandatory program should consist of is beyond
the scope of this Note. The following are some of the issues that must be addressed:
the value limitation of claims, what actions should be excluded from arbitration, how
arbitrators should be selected and the number to select, and what powers the arbitrator
should have. This author suggests that program designers should look at mandatory
programs in other states for an idea of the types of provisions to include.
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will be. Generally speaking, if greater state control is the goal,
then Kentucky should adopt detailed provisions. This will allow
control over local programs for the furthering of broader state
goals. It will also promote continuity in the program. If greater
local control is the goal, however, then broadly drawn provisions
should be adopted. This will allow local courts to "pursue the
objectives of the program aggressively" and "tailor their pro-
grams to existing legal practices and court management struc-
tures."' 8 8 Additionally, by adopting broad provisions, local
jurisdictions will be able to experiment with different alterna-
tives, creating an invaluable testing ground for future pro-
grams. 189
C. Control-Group Evaluation Program
To determine whether Kentucky's mandatory court-annexed
program is meeting the needs and goals of the state's judicial
system, a control-group evaluation program should be adopted.
An evaluation program is used to accomplish four objectives:
(1) to determine if court-annexed arbitration is meeting its in-
tended objectives; (2) to determine if the specific provisions of
the program are effective; (3) to determine if changes previously
made in the program are effective; and (4) to determine if the
program is satisfactory to participants. 190 Information needed to
M' E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at 9.
189 Id.
1' Id. at ix. North Carolina was the first state program to be evaluated by a
control-group study. Note, supra note 20, at 409. The following factors were exanned:
(I) The time from filing of a case to its disposition;
(2) The rate of termination of cases by other types of disposition, such as
settlement or dismissal, before or after arbitration;
(3) Amount of recovery;
(4) Cost to court and litigants;
(5) Degree of satisfaction of attorneys and litigants;
(6) Costs and benefits to litigants; and
(7) The effect of attorney vs. non-attorney representation dunng arbitra-
tion.
Id. n.37 (quoting Letter from Larry B. Sitton, Chairman, Dispute Resolution Committee,
and Allan B. Head, Executive Director, to the Judges and Lawyers of the Twenty-Ninth
Judicial District (Dec. 14, 1986)).




evaluate court-annexed arbitration can be obtained from "four
different sources: individual cases; court caseload statistics; court
cost data; and attitudinal surveys." 1 91
Once the information needed for the evaluation is obtained,
an effective evaluation can take place:
The "Acid Test" for court-[annexed] arbitration may be a
comparison of the incidence of trial de novo with cases that
regularly go to trial. To make this comparison, it is necessary
to determine the incidence of trials of similar cases in the
absence of the arbitration program. A finding that the inci-
dence of trials de novo is equal to or greater than the incidence
of actual tnals of similar cases in the regular tnal track would
raise serious questions concermng the efficiency of a pro-
gram.' 92
Kentucky should adopt a control-group evaluation program
when it implements its court-annexed arbitration program. This
"acid test" could prove beneficial by allowing program designers
to obtain information for subsequent improvements in the pro-
gram.
CONCLUSION
The explosion of litigation in this country has created nu-
merous problems for our judicial system. The citizens of this
country have indeed become disgruntled with the growing prob-
lems of litigation delays and case backlogs. "Justice delayed is
justice demed,"1 93 and to prevent this denial of justice, alterna-
tives to litigation must be adopted. Court-annexed arbitration iS
one form of alternative dispute resolution used to solve the
problems confronting our courts.
This Note has addressed at length the concept of court-
annexed arbitration. 94 The advantages of court-annexed arbitra-
tion are numerous, 9 5 whether mandatory or permissive. 196 The
"I E. ROLPH, supra note 5, at x.
,9 Note, supra note 20, at 416.
"I Note, supra note 3, at 1062.
14 See supra notes 25-77 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
'49 For a discussion of mandatory and permissive court-annexed arbitration, see
supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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biggest obstacle facing these programs is the constitutional im-
plications surrounding them. 197 This obstacle, however, should
not prevent Kentucky from adopting court-annexed arbitration.
Many states have already adopted court-annexed arbitration
programs to help solve the problems of increasing litigation. 19
Kentucky should join these states in reducing costs, delays, and
frustrations caused by the state's court system. Kentucky should
adopt a mandatory program to better attain the goals and ob-
jectives accomplished through court-annexed arbitration. The
need is here and Kentucky must accept the challenge.
Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger has stated that the
legal community "should provide mechanisms that can produce
an acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the least
possible expense, and with a mimmum of stress on the partici-
pants. That is what justice is all about."' 99 Court-annexed ar-
bitration promotes this canon and provides a viable alternative
to litigation in today's litigious world.
James C. Thornton**
"9 See supra notes 101-77 and accompanying text.
M9' "As of late 1985 eighteen states had adopted the device." Note, supra note
20, at 401.
199 Burger, supra note 3, at 274.
** The author would like to express his appreciation to Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky, for his insight, suggestions, and support.
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